Privacy is Linking Permission to Purpose by Massacci, Fabio & Zannone, Nicola
UNIVERSITY
OF TRENTO
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
38050 Povo – Trento (Italy), Via Sommarive 14
http://www.dit.unitn.it
PRIVACY IS LINKING PERMISSION TO PURPOSE
Fabio Massacci and Nicola Zannone
 
2004
Technical Report # DIT-04-084
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
Privacy is Linking Permission to Purpose∗
Fabio Massacci
DIT
University of Trento
massacci@dit.unitn.it
Nicola Zannone
DIT
University of Trento
zannone@dit.unitn.it
Abstract
The last years have seen a peak in privacy related research. The
focus has been mostly on how to protect the individual from being
tracked, with plenty of anonymizing solutions.
We advocate another model that is closer to the “physical” world:
we consider our privacy respected when our personal data is used for
the purpose for which we gave it in the first place.
Essentially, in any distributed authorization protocol, credentials
should mention their purpose beside their powers. For this information
to be meaningful we should link it to the functional requirements of
the original application.
We sketch how one can modify a requirement engineering method-
ology to incorporate security concerns so that we explicitly trace back
the high-level goals for which a functionality has been delegated by a
(human or software) agent to another one. Then one could be directly
derive purpose-based trust management solutions from the require-
ments.
1 Privacy Protection and Cleaning Ladies
Consumer privacy1 is a growing concern in the marketplace. While the
concerns are most prominent for e-commerce, the privacy concerns for tra-
ditional transactions are increasing as well. Some enterprises are aware of
∗This work has been partially funded by the IST programme of the EU Commission,
FET under the IST-2001-37004 WASP project and by the FIRB programme of MIUR
under the RBNE0195K5 ASTRO Project. We would like to thank P. Giorgini, M. Pistore,
and J. Mylopoulos for many useful discussions on Tropos.
1Privacy is the right of individuals to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others (Alan Westin).
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these problems and of the market share they might loose if they do not
implement proper privacy practices. As a consequence enterprises publish
privacy statements that promise fair information practices2.
There are a number of risks to an enterprise if it does not manage its
personally identifiable information correctly. Recently, many countries have
promulgated a new privacy legislation. Most of these laws incorporate rules
governing collection, use, store and distribution of personally identifiable
information. It is up to an organization to ensure that data processing op-
erations respect any legislative requirements. If an enterprise breaches trust,
that is, it uses data for other purposes, then it can be sued. Further, busi-
ness relationships are built on trust. Organizations that demonstrate good
privacy practices can build trust. Organizations with no privacy practices
will turn away customers.
The last years have seen a substantial increase in privacy-related security
research3: we have a number of dedicated workshops (e.g. PET, WPES),
a number of European and US projects and standard initiatives such as
P3P. In the realm of cryptography the work on anonymizing networks and
transactions has a long history since Chaum’s first proposals. One could
even say that trust negotiation’s birth itself [11] was spurred by privacy
concerns of non-disclosure of sensitive credentials to unknown strangers.
However, the current set of solutions is slight unsatisfactory: we must
either struggle on keeping privacy by a complex cryptographic infrastructure
or be involved in complex protocols for trust negotiation.
Not long ago, at a Cambridge seminar, Robert Morris, formerly from the
US NSA, spoke about the cryptographic role of the cleaning ladies, inviting
people to consider the actual perimeter of one’s secure systems. We would
like to use the example with a slightly different view.
Indeed, from the standpoint of access control and privacy protection, the
problem of the cleaning ladies admits no solution. The cleaning lady must
have access to the room and even when the room is not occupied to avoid
disturbing people while at work. There is no way to prevent her from looking
at the papers laying on the desk, even searching through them, doing any
possible action on the unattended desktop and leaving unnoticed.
Yet, we do allow cleaning ladies and we are perfectly happy with many
others similar problems. One possible explanation may be in the the actual
2The OECD defined a set of privacy principles in 1980. The document OECD Guide-
lines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data is considered
to contain the core requirements for managing privacy today.
3A comprehensive and updated literature survey can be found at
http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/date.html.
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economics of trust in cleaning ladies wrt the risk of privacy losses [12]. How-
ever, we believe that the solutions lies in the implicit permission model that
we use in the physical world, but so far we have not implemented in trust
management protocols.
So it is useful to consider how the legal profession defines the power
of attorney : with the general power of attorney the individual appointed
attorney in fact is vested with unlimited powers for an indefinite amount
of time (unless otherwise explicitly specified). The validity of this of power
of attorney ceases only with a specific written revocation or with the death
of the person that has granted it. This is the way we used as delegation of
“identity” works in trust management systems4, and is also the idea behind
usage of data by systems. Once the system has the data, it will be used.
We can read privacy policies to guarantee that the data will not be misused
but we have no way to know that this policy will actually be enforced by
the system. Privacy polices are added after the system has been built.
What is interesting for our purposes is the special power of attorney :
the individual appointed attorney is vested solely with the power needed
to carry out a specific affair (i.e. the sale or purchase of a real estate or a
car). Therefore, in the formal contract it is necessary to indicate exactly the
particular power that the principal intends to give to his attorney. Actual
documents state quite explicitly the powers but also the goal for with these
powers have been delegated. If I have to sell a house I may do all that I deem
fit, but everything got tagged by that purpose and if my action is clearly not
necessary I might be asked to pay for incurred losses. This is the missing
important twist: in our trust management and data processing systems we
have implemented only the description of powers but not the purpose.
Back to the cleaning lady, in giving her the door’s key we have stipulated
(or better our administration has) a contract that she has the permission
of entering the room with the goal of cleaning it. Any other action would
constitute breach of contract and would result in fees or contract resolution.
That’s our claim: we feel that our privacy is protected because the per-
mission we are granting is linked to a purpose. Notice that the the purpose
is not at all security related but rather a functional goal of the system.
There are already solutions to link permissions to purpose in databases,
such as the work on Hippocratic databases [1], but we found no proposals
for other methods for data and credential management in distributed trust
management or trust negotiation. However, it is not difficult to add yet
another field to an X.509/SPKI/etc. certificate format.
4This is the A speaks for B paradigm of SDSI/SPKI [6]
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The intriguing issue is how can we link the permission in a credential
doled out by the security sub-system to the actual functional goals of the
entire system?
The strategy that we envisage is the following:
• find a “traditional” requirements methodology in which functional
goals can be made explicit;
• enhance the methodology with security-related features such as trust
and delegation that are linked to the explicit goals;
• each time a delegation of permission must be foreseen by the system
designer, she can trace back on the design the goals and make that
explicit.
2 Related Work
The last years have seen an increasing awareness that privacy plays a key role
in system development and deployment. This awareness has been matched
by a number of research proposals on privacy. Next, we present some of
those adopting solution to link permissions to purpose.
Platform for Privacy Preferences5 (P3P), developed by the World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C), is an emerging standard whose goal is to enable
users to gain more control over the use of their personally identifiable infor-
mation (PII) on web sites they visit. P3P enables web sites to express their
privacy practices in a standard format that can be retrieved automatically
and interpreted easily by user. P3P provides a way for a web site to en-
code its data-collection and data-use practices in a machine-readable XML
format known as a P3P policy.
P3P policies provide contact information for the legal entity making the
representation of privacy practices in a policy, enumerate the types of data or
data elements collected, and explain how the data will be used. In addition,
policies identify the data recipients, and make a variety of other disclosures
including information about dispute resolution, and the address of a site’s
human-readable privacy policy. In other words, P3P policies represent the
practices of the site. Each P3P policy is applied to specific web resources
listed in a policy reference file. By placing one or more P3P policies on
a web site, a company does not make any statements about the privacy
practices associated with other web resources not mentioned in their policy
5http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/
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reference file, with other online activities that do not involve data collected
on web sites covered by their P3P policy, or with oﬄine activities that do
not involve data collected on web sites covered by their P3P policy.
Agrawal et al. [2] propose an server-centric architecture for P3P. The
P3P protocol has two parts: Privacy Policies, an XML format in which a
web site can encode its data-collection and data-use practices, and Privacy
Preferences, an XML format for specifying client privacy preferences. In
the server-centric architecture, a web site first installs its privacy policy in
a data system. Then database querying is used for maching a user privacy
preference against privacy policies. Finally, web site sent result of matching
preference against policy to the client, and the client requests web page if
policy conforms to his/her preference. This approach is different from ours,
because it does not explain the permission purpose that is implicit in privacy
policies of the web site. Further, the client have to choose without knowing
all the available policies of the web site. For example, there are web sites
that provide services only if a client agrees a certain policy, but they show
multi-policies without specifying which policy is sufficient to get the service.
In this case the client could grant more permissions than necessary.
In summary, as a first step towards managing privacy, organizations
publish privacy promises. The P3P statements can be used by a P3P client
(e.g. the Internet Explorer 6 web browser) to notify the user automatically
whether the privacy policy of the enterprise matches that configured by the
user. However, this is not sufficient to guarantee the enforcement of the
promises that enterprises have made, and has resulted in privacy violations,
even from well meaning companies. In fact, P3P is an language for express-
ing privacy promises on web sites, but it cannot be used to enforce them
within an enterprise.
The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language6 (EPAL), developed by
IBM, enables an enterprise to formalize the exact privacy policy that shall
be enforced within the enterprise. It formalizes the privacy promises into
policies and associates a consented policy to each piece of collected data.
This consented policy can then be used in access control decisions to enforce
the privacy promises made. The EPAL policy language categorizes the data
an enterprise holds and the rules which govern the usage of data of each
category. An EPAL policy is essentially a set of privacy rules. A rule is
a statement that includes a data user, an action, a data category, and a
purpose. A rule may also contain conditions and obligations.
Next, we present an architecture for implementing privacy management
6http://www.zurich.ibm.com/security/enterprise-privacy/epal/
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based on EPAL. During submission of PII, the privacy management system
(by submission monitors) will create the submission records. This data is a
permanent record of when PII was submitted, what privacy policy version
was in place at that time, and what the users preferences were. Later, when
PII is to be accessed, the privacy management enforcement monitors ensure
that only data accesses are allowed that conform to the privacy policy. They
also create access records that record which user accessed the data and for
what purpose. The combination of submission and enforcement monitors
allow the enterprise to prove that it is a good data keeper and gives the
enterprise some assurance that it is enforcing its stated privacy policy.
EPAL aims at formalizing enterprise-internal privacy policies. This re-
quires a vocabulary that formalizes the privacy relevant aspects of an enter-
prise. It also includes a hierarchy of purposes for which the enterprise collects
data. On the other hand, P3P aims at formalizing privacy statements that
are published by an enterprise. The goal is to define a machine-readable
equivalent for the human readable privacy promises that are published as a
privacy statement on a web page. Unlike EPAL, P3P defines a global termi-
nology that can be used to describe the privacy promises for any enterprise.
Although P3P is well suited for expressing policies, it is not as suitable for
expressing an internal enforceable privacy policy. EPAL on the other hand
is designed specifically to express an internal privacy policy that can be
enforced by an enterprise privacy management system. IBM is currently
investigating how to project a P3P policy from EPAL.
There are already solutions to link permissions to purpose in databases.
Following this approach, Agrawal et al. show that the database community
has the opportunity to play a central role re-designing databases to include
responsability for the privacy of data as a fundamental tenet. Inspired by
the Hippocratic Oath, they propose to call Hippocratic databases [1] those
databases that have privacy as a central concern. Agrawal et al. propose
the key principles for such Hippocratic database systems, distilled from the
principles behind current privacy legislations and guidelines. Particularly,
such principles highlight that the purposes for which PII has been collected
shall be stored with that information in the databases, that the purposes
associated with PII shall have consent of the owner of data, and that the
PII collected, used, and stored shall be limited to the minimum necessary
for accomplishing the specified purposes.
Hippocratic databases can be useful to add enforcement dimension to
P3P. As we have seen above, a P3P policy essentially describes the purpose
of the collection of information along with the intended recipients. The
policy description uses data tags to specify the data items for which the
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policy is being stated. P3P’s concepts of purpose and retention can be
mapped directly into analogous concepts in Hippocratic databases. Thus,
from a P3P policy it is possible to generate the corresponding data structures
(i.e., a privacy-policies table) in the Hippocratic database system.
What is still missing in these proposals is capturing the high-level privacy
requirements, without getting suddenly bogged down into security solutions
or cryptographic algorithms. If we look at the requirements refinement pro-
cess of many proposals, we find out that at certain stage a leap is made:
we have a system with no privacy features consisting of high-level func-
tionalities, and the next refinement shows encryption, access control and
authentication. The modeling process should instead makes it clear why
encryption, access control and authentication are necessary. This work is
a step in this direction closing the gap between the functional and privacy
requirements and the trust management architecture that is now emerging
as the standard way to implement security in distributed systems.
3 Goal-Oriented Security Engineering
The basic building block is a “traditional” requirements methodology in
which functional goals are explicit: the Tropos framework. It is an agent-
based software engineering methodology [3, 4] that strives to model both the
organizational environment of a system and the system itself. It uses the
concepts of actor, goal, plan, resource and social dependency for defining
obligations of actors (dependees) to other actors (dependers). Actors have
strategic goals within the system or the organization and represent (social)
agents (organizational, human or software), roles etc. A goal represents some
strategic interest of an actor. A plan represents a way of doing something (in
particular, a plan can be executed to satisfy a goal). A resource represents
a physical or an informational entity. Finally, a dependency between two
actors indicates that one actor depends on another to accomplish a goal,
execute a plan, or deliver a resource. In the sequel, when the distinction
between goal, plan or resource is not essential we use the term service to
denote any of them.
Tropos has been designed with cooperative information systems in mind
and therefore it is already equipped with a methodology for reasoning about
functional delegation of goals. Goal delegation arises quite naturally among
cooperative, rational actors: every actor pursues its own goals, goal parti-
tioning is a standard divide-and-conqueror strategy, and usually in a collab-
orative environment there are enough hierarchy and trust relationships, so
7
that an actor is likely to find some other one to delegate a subgoal. When
considered from an actor coordination perspective, goal delegation has two
main facets:
• Delegation of commitment. This means that the delegatee should em-
brace the intentions of the delegater, trying to fulfill the goal as it was
one of its own. From delegater point of view, this requires a kind of
trust: the delegater has to believe that the delegatee is trustworthy
and will honestly try to achieve the goal.
• Delegation of strategy. Delegating a declarative goal instead of an
operational plan means that the delegater is interested only in the
resulting outcome and not in a specific way the delegatee fulfill it.
The incorporation of security features in Tropos is not trivial and is dis-
cussed in another paper [7]. It is essentially based on the following intuition:
in the dependency relationship it is implicitly assumed that if I delegate the
execution of a service to somebody else I’m implicitly also the owner of
this service. This implicit assumption is no longer true when also security
requirements and not just functional requirements are part of the target.
In this modeling framework, four relationships (beside the old functional
dependency) can be singled out:
trust (among two agents and a service), so that A trust B on a certain goal
G;
delegation (among two agents and a service), whenever A explicitly del-
egates to B a goal, or the permission to execute a plan or access a
resource;
offer (between an agent and a service), so that A can offer to other agents
the possibility of fulfilling a goal, executing a plan or delivering a
resource;
ownership (between an agent and a service), whenever an agent is the
legitemate owner of a goal, plan or resource.
Note the difference between trust and delegation. Delegation marks a
formal passage in the requirements modeling: a TM certificate will have to
be eventually issued for the delegatee when implementing the system. In
contrast, trust marks simply a social relationship that is not formalized by a
“contract” (such as digital credential). There might be cases (e.g. because
it is impractical or too costly), where we might be happy with a “social”
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protection, and other cases in which security is essential. In this model,
there is no relationship between trust and delegation
The requirements engineering methodology proposed in [7] specifies how
to derive the trust management system (aka the delegation relationship)
from the general requirement:
1. design a trust model among the actors of the systems;
2. identify who owns goals, plans, or resources and who is able to fulfill
goals, execute plans or deliver resources;
3. define functional dependencies (functional delegations) of goals among
agents building a functional model;
4. define a trust management implementation (e.g. based on the Delega-
tion logics by Li et al. [8, 9, 10]) in which the delegation of permissions
is defined.
In [7] it is also shown how one can use Datalog and the DLV system [5]
to model check the correctness of the implementation wrt the previous two
model or the consistency of the functional model with the trust model.
However, in [7] there is no notion of Goal-linked permission, though
the framework have all necessary machinery, simply because all considered
target trust management systems for the last phase have no notion of Goal-
linked permission.
4 A basic e-Health case study
Here we show a very basic case study, based on a modelling an e-Health
service. We consider the following actors:
• Patient, that depends on the hospital for receiving appropriate health
care;
• Hospital, that provides medical treatment and depends on the patients
for having their personal information.
• Clinician, physician of the hospital that provides medical health advice
and, whenever needed, provide accurate medical treatment;
• Health Care Authority (HCA) that control and guarantee the fair re-
sources allocation and a good quality of the delivered services.
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Figure 1: Health Care System trust model
• Medical Information System, that, according the current privacy leg-
islation, can share the patients medical data if and only if consent
is obtained. The Medical Information System manages patients infor-
mation, including information about the medical treatments they have
received.
In order to provide rapid and accurate medical treatments, clinicians
need a fast access to their patient’ medical data. Similarly, HCA needs
a fast and reliable access to the data in order to allocate effectively the
available resources, and guaranteeing then that each patient can receive a
good quality of medical care. Furthermore, HCA wants to be sure that the
system cannot be defrauded in any way and that clinicians and patients
behave within the limits of their roles. To the other hand, the obvious right
of the patient to restrict access on his/her medical data and moreover, to be
able to use some safeguards on the privacy of these data, should be taken
into serious consideration. The patient’s consent must be requested, and he
must be notified when its data is shared.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show respectively the trust model and the func-
tional model. Actors are represented as circles, goals by ovals, plans by
polygons and relationships by labelled arrows. The ownership relationship
has an edge labelled by O. We use trust (T) to model the basic trust rela-
tionship between agents and permission (P) to model the actual transfer of
rights in some form (e.g. a digital certificate, a signed paper, etc.). This is
the delegation of permission. The plain D is used for dependency, that is
the functional delegation.
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Figure 2: Health Care System functional model
In the trust model Patient trusts HCA and Clinician for his personal in-
formation, and HCA trusts Hospital for it. Further, Hospital trusts HCA for
checking equity resource distribution. Clinician trusts Hospital for medical
treatment and for requesting specific professional consulting, and Hospital
trusts Clinician for providing such consulting and for patient personal in-
formation. We also consider the trust relationship between Hospital and
Medical System Information for patient personal information. Notice on
top of Fig. 1 that there is a trust relationship between two actors (HCA and
Hospital) on a resource that is owned by neither of them.
In the functional model, Patient depends on Hospital for medical treat-
ments, and in turn, Hospital depends on Clinician for such treatments. To
provide accurate medical treatment, Clinician can request specific profes-
sional consultancy to Hospital that depends on other Clinicians for this
consultancy. Hospital delegates the goal of checking equity resource distri-
bution to Health Care Authority. Clinician and Health Care Authority need
patient personal information to fulfill their service. Thus, Patient delegates
them his personal information. Further, Health Care Authority re-delegates
these data to Hospital.
Notice that it is not necessary for the owner of the data to delegate the
data directly to the entity that will use the service. For example here the
patient can delegate the usage of his personal information to the HCA with a
certain depth so that HCA can eventually re-delegate it to the actual service
provider.
This trust-functional-TM implementation process is not static: require-
ments can be refined, new actors can be introduced, delegations can be split
or passed further down the line, etc. To clarify refinement analysis in Tro-
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pos, one can use rationale diagrams that explain relationships among actors
and decompose high level goals into subgoals as in Figure 3. This makes
even more explicit how permissions should be linked to high-level goals.
5 Linking Permission to Purpose
Now we have all the necessary machinery to ensure the patient that his
privacy will not be violated. It is of course possible to specify in details all
possible delegations in this model. Indeed, this is what has been done in the
paper [7]. The formal analysis carried out there has shown that this process
is extremely error prone and even the expansion of delegation certificates to
include blacklists may not be sufficient to rule out certain delegation paths.
In this setting is may seem unnecessary to link permission to goals: after
all, few lines above we have just defined delegation as a ternary relations
between a pair of agents and a service (which might be a goal). This is
not what we meant by tagging permissions to purpose. The three-place
delegation is a delegation of a permission. Simply the framework makes it
possible to delegate something better than a simple action such as exec, or
a resource. So I can delegate a plan (which is just a big composite fixed
action) or a goal in which case I simply delegate all possible plans that can
fulfill the goal. If we go back to the special power of attorney we have only
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mentioned the how but not the why.
The direct base case for linking permission to purpose is the following:
1. the owner and the depender of a service are the same actor
2. the service is a primary service of the depender and has not been
obtained by refinement from other goals7.
In this case the delegation of the service from the owner to the provider
of the service is tagged by the service of the functional dependency of the
owner.
In the reverse base case the owner and the dependee of the service co-
incides. Also in this case the credential should be tagged with the goal of
the owner but it is worth noting that the emission of this credential is not
trivial. Indeed, the owner of the service should have some reason to delegate
a service besides a cooperative spirit.
Notice that this is not really the case in our e-health example. For
example the Hospital do need the patient personal data (of which the patient
is at the same time the owner and the dependee). However, in this case the
patient personal data is obtained during the design process as a refinement
of the patient’s own goal of obtaining care which has been delegated to the
hospital. In most practical cases this is the typical format: an high-level goal
of agent A is delegated to agent B and after a suitable number of recursions
and refinements a subgoals is delegated from C back to A.This is typically
providing information for actually fulfilling some other task necessary for
the overall goal.
In the general case we have that
1. owner A, depender B, and dependee C of a service are all different
actors,
2. the service S is a derived service from another goal Gd of the depender,
3. the service is also a derived service from a possibly different goal Go
of the owner.
The simplest solution is to add the conjunction Gd ∧Go of the owner’s goal
and the depender’s goal to the digital credential. There might be cases in
which the designer may want different schemes.
7In the Tropos methodology only goals can be refined. We stick to this line here,
though from a security perspective also resources may be additionally refined for fine-
grained access control.
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After the linkage between permission and purpose has been put in place,
we can check that a delegation chain is also an appropriate delegation of
purpose by checking that each goal along the delegation is a subgoal of the
initial base case and each step is also appropriate. This can be easily done
within the same datalog framework used in [7]
An interesting question is whether we should have also noted in the
delegation credential the actual agent names to which the “purpose”-goals
belonged. So far we could not find a situation in which such information is
needed and cannot be reconstructed from the delegation chain.
6 Conclusions?
In framework we have proposed, privacy is considered during the whole
process of requirements analysis modeling trust and delegation relationships
between the stackholders and the system-to-be. In this way, the framework
we propose allows to capture privacy requirements at an organizational level,
and hence, to help designers to model privacy concerns throughout the whole
software development process.
In this paper we have discussed how a trust management (sub)system
can accommodate the notion of purpose of a permission by linking it di-
rectly with the functional requirement of the overall information system.
This makes possible to capture the high-level privacy requirements with-
out taking cryptographic algorithms or protocols for trust negotiation into
considerations.
There are a number of open questions that we have not answered and
that are worth discussing:
• which format can be used for goals in certificates? A string field costs
nothing to include but in this way all possibilities that we have listed
of linking goals to subgoals would be lost as only equality would be
tested. So a semantic web solution may be used but this may be costly
from a processing perspective.
• are distributed implementations possible? and in particular can exist-
ing implementations of Trust Management systems be ported to this
new framework (at least under the assumption that somebody has
already magically derived the goal-oriented trust management imple-
mentation)? How effective and essential should purpose verification in
the credential chain be?
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• how history should be presented in the purpose? One possible solution
is no history at all, just mention the last delegation step; another
solution could be let history be recovered by the chain of credentials
so that one could finally check if all credential have been gathered for
the appropriate purpose.
• what kind of automatic support could be available for the automatic
synthesis and validation of the trust management implementation.
• can we define a similar process for the definition of Hippocratic databases?
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